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SEEKING LIBERTY, FINDING 
PATRIARCHY: THE COMMON LAW’S 
HISTORICAL LEGACY 
DEBORAH DINNER* 
Abstract: Anita Bernstein’s important new book argues that the common law 
might be used to advance women’s liberation. In this short essay, I analyze Bern-
stein’s three modes of historical analysis: redeeming the common law where it 
enforced oppression, recovering it when it promoted women’s rights, and facili-
tating its evolution toward a feminist future. I argue that Bernstein’s account, 
though learned and compelling, sidelines the centrality of patriarchy to the com-
mon law. Adopting the liberty of the patriarch cannot realize true freedom for 
women. By appropriating common law doctrines, feminists risk forging a con-
ceptual alliance with the very ideologies that enforced gender, race, and class 
subordination. Women’s freedom must be realized not through patriarchy’s tools 
but through legal theories that stress relationship, vulnerability, and social wel-
fare obligations. 
INTRODUCTION 
In her erudite new book, Anita Bernstein makes the provocative argument 
that the common law liberates women.1 The Common Law Inside the Female 
Body argues that women might exercise their property, contract, and tort rights 
to advance their freedom. In this account, exclusion, consent, and autonomy 
emerge as feminist tools. Bernstein thus poses a dramatic challenge to the con-
ventional wisdom that the common law oppressed women historically and 
holds minimal relevance for women’s liberation today. 
The Common Law Inside the Female Body is primarily a work of feminist 
jurisprudence and not legal history. It does, however, use history in three ways. 
First, Bernstein analyzes historical texts in an effort to redeem the common 
law. She identifies instances in which the common law departed in practice 
from its true tenets and seeks to recover its inherent meaning. Second, she en-
gages historical scholarship, arguing that in other instances, the common law 
has always served women’s interests. Third, the book itself advances the his-
torical evolution of the common law. Bernstein makes novel legal arguments 
that, if realized in court, would enable women to enjoy liberties that the law 
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has long guaranteed (white, propertied) men.2 In this brief essay, I suggest that 
distinguishing among these three modes of historical argument, and analyzing 
the relationship between them, enables us to better understand and evaluate 
Bernstein’s important thesis. 
I. SEEKING LIBERTY: THREE USES OF HISTORY IN  
THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 
Bernstein’s analysis of the common law necessarily begins with the status 
of married white women and slaves. Bernstein argues that the common law 
betrayed its commitments by condoning slavery. Criminal and tort law, for ex-
ample, were rendered incoherent by slave owners’ rights to beat their slaves.3 
This is primarily a philosophical and aspirational point—a claim about what 
the common law might have been and not what it was. Bernstein makes a more 
historically contextualized claim regarding coverture. Although it imposed sta-
tus-based detriments on married women, it nonetheless protected women’s 
“entitlement to be free from unwanted incursions or invasions.”4 The common 
law in the United States, Bernstein contends, took a tragic historical turn that 
made it more oppressive of women than it needed to be. This happened be-
cause American legal thinkers interpreted William Blackstone’s Commentaries 
on the Law of England to imply a more totalizing subjugation of married 
women than Blackstone had himself intended. Americans also overlooked the 
significance of equity and ecclesiastical courts as counterpoints to common 
law authority.5 In an evolution that continued to the late twentieth century, 
Bernstein argues, the common law came to recognize that women, too, have a 
right “to say no to what they don’t want.”6 
Bernstein’s initial use of history is thus a redemptive one. She seeks to 
isolate the moments at which the common law strayed and then to regenerate it 
in a purer state. Her approach provides a valuable account of how political 
context shapes the reception of legal texts and how legal pluralism gives rise to 
monopolistic legal regimes. Yet Bernstein underemphasizes the fact that the 
domestic law of master and servant determined the status of slaves and married 
white women alike. This well documented historical insight explains what 
might otherwise appear to be a paradox. How could the common law deny in-
dividual rights to slaves and subjugate married white women under the legal 
identities of their husbands if it was purportedly committed to negative liberty? 
Bernstein argues that the common law somehow went afoul. But the historical 
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answer is not that the common law tripped up on its own logic. Rather, the op-
pression of slaves and the subordination of married white women was funda-
mental to the common law regime. The oppression of some was understood as 
a necessary predicate to the freedom enjoyed by others.7 
In arenas beyond coverture, Bernstein does not find the need to redeem 
the common law. She recovers other arenas in which the common law gave 
women ways to defend against intrusions to their bodies. Her most persuasive 
example is abortion. Prior to the late nineteenth century, the common law did 
not make women culpable for terminating their pregnancies. Bernstein also 
emphasizes criminal prohibitions on abortion provision applied only after 
quickening—when women began to feel movement of the fetus. This, Bern-
stein argues, shows that the common law affirmed women’s own experience of 
pregnancy.8 Bernstein argues that the social derogation of women, rather than 
the common law, accounted for the subsequent rise of legislation interfering 
with women’s rights to end unwanted pregnancies.9 
Last, Bernstein acts as a historical agent herself when she occupies the 
role of a jurist. She harnesses the potential of the common law to take it in new 
directions. The most original parts of the book argue that the negative liberties 
enshrined in the common law might be coupled with formal sex equality to 
promote women’s rights to bodily autonomy and integrity. Bernstein makes a 
persuasive argument drawing on property law. She analogizes women’s pos-
session of their bodies to property owners’ possession of land and chattel.10 
Women are thereby entitled to cash damages when they endure unwanted sex-
ual penetration, including compensation for emotional, physical, and economic 
harms.11 
Bernstein’s more startling arguments conclude that the common law gives 
women the right to kill in certain instances. Common law doctrines give indi-
viduals the right to kill in defense of life, health, and habitation. In particular, 
the “castle doctrine” gives individuals the right to use force to keep out intrud-
ers in their home and deadly force against someone who has invaded. Drawing 
on these doctrines, Bernstein argues that women have the right to kill persons 
who attempt to rape them.12 Bernstein also argues that the common law simi-
larly gives pregnant women the right to kill an unwanted fetus. Bernstein con-
ceptualizes the zygote, embryo, and fetus as invaders within a woman’s body. 
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Common law self-defense doctrines thereby give women the right to use con-
traception and abortion (even when her life is not threatened by the pregnan-
cy).13 Bernstein thus concludes that the common law protects women’s abor-
tion rights to a greater extent than constitutional privacy does. In making these 
novel arguments about rape and abortion, Bernstein acts herself as a historical 
agent of legal change. 
Bernstein thus makes three historical moves. Reconsidering the law of 
coverture, she argues that the common law might be redeemed from its oppres-
sive tendencies. Analyzing the history of abortion, she argues that in some in-
stances the common law protected women’s liberty. Last, analyzing the cases 
of rape and abortion, Bernstein argues that the common law may be used to 
protect women from intrusions by both private individuals and the state. How 
might we reconcile these three forms of historical argument in The Common 
Law Inside the Female Body? My contention is that only by sidelining patriar-
chy can we render a conceptual transformation of the common law, from op-
pression to liberty. 
II. FINDING PATRIARCHY: THE COMMON LAW’S  
LEGACY FOR CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM 
To understand the limits of the common law’s potential to further wom-
en’s liberation, we need to recognize the centrality of patriarchy to its history. 
The precepts of the common law that guaranteed negative liberty to propertied 
white men were inextricable from patriarchal authority in domestic and politi-
cal governance. The organization of the household with a husband and father at 
the helm and wife, servants, slaves, and children as dependents produced cov-
erture’s ecology of support and dependence.14 Though the common law gave 
women limited ability to control their reproductive capacities and to choose to 
consent (or not) to marriage, the common law did not protect them from bodily 
invasion. The husband’s right to beat his wife was at the core and not the pe-
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riphery of patriarchal household authority.15 Even the liberal principles that 
many feminists now privilege were intertwined with patriarchy. Consent, for 
example, which Bernstein places at the heart of women’s liberty, was tied in 
Enlightenment political authority to the rise of paternal custody rights.16 
Centering patriarchy raises several questions about what it might mean to 
advance women’s liberation via common law doctrines. To begin, it might re-
quire feminists to forge troubling ideological alliances. Bernstein foregrounds 
women’s liberty to defend against bodily intrusion in property owners’ rights 
to exclude. She thus diminishes a countervailing, progressive tradition of state 
limitation on property owners’ sovereignty.17 Reifying the most conservative 
strain of property law, however, harms efforts to develop an intersectional fem-
inist analysis that takes account of race and class injustices as well as women’s 
rights. Consider, for example, the argument that feminists might deploy the 
castle doctrine to protect women’s bodily autonomy. This would buttress the 
same doctrine that has justified homeowners’ violence against African Ameri-
cans viewed as unwanted strangers in majority-white neighborhoods.18 In addi-
tion, imagining women’s liberation through the lens of the common law leads 
to a highly individualistic conception of freedom. Last, as Bernstein observes, 
the common law can only guarantee negative liberty and not affirmative mate-
rial supports.19 We might wonder whether women’s freedom and liberation 
might ever be achieved by giving women the rights of the patriarch. Doing so 
would fail to challenge the fundamental principles—the privileging of private 
property, the isolation of the family from state interference, and the lack of du-
ties of care—that have long underpinned racial and gender hierarchies. 
When we instead focus on disrupting patriarchal common law doctrines, 
the problem of gender injustice and its solutions appear different. From this 
vantage, we see that feminist theorists might instead develop theories of prop-
erty law that subordinate private ownership to communal interest or theories of 
tort that recognize higher duties of care. As scholars have argued, we need to 
develop legal jurisprudence that affirms human relationship and interdepend-
ence rather than autonomy.20 To realize reproductive control, we need to advo-
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cate universal healthcare, and we must conceptualize the right to bodily integ-
rity in light of the human need for safe and adequate housing. Bernstein does 
not endorse uncritically the common law’s overlap with contemporary femi-
nism. She states clearly that she is not always in agreement with its precepts. 
She may even agree with some of my concerns. But I remain skeptical that 
women might ever find real freedom by adopting the liberty of the patriarch. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, I am deeply grateful to Anita Bernstein for writing a compel-
ling and brilliant book. It made me think more deeply than any other single 
work of scholarship about the relationship between feminism and the common 
law. Moving forward, no legal theorist will be able to analyze women’s rights, 
equality, rape law, or abortion without wrestling with Bernstein’s thesis. 
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